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Abstract 
Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve syllogistic 
reasoning problem. This type of problems is considered as reflection of major critical thinking skill – i.e. putting aside one’s 
prior knowledge and reason from new premises. The paper presents results of a study with 597 future teachers, in which we 
examined their ability to resist belief bias and whether it can be connected to their cognitive abilities (intelligence measured 
by Vienna Matrix Test) or cognitive dispositions (Master Rationality Motive Scale). Results showed that participants 
showed highest belief bias with problems that were either valid, but unbelievable, or invalid but believable with cognitive 
abilities only weakly correlated with resisting to belief bias (only in case of valid but unbelievable problems). Results are 
discussed in terms of their implication for rationality debate and newly proposed Stanovichʼs tripartite model of human 
mind. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Rationality and cognitive ability 
The association between higher cognitive abilities and rationality is not straightforward. The vast amount of 
research in heuristic and biases program revealed that despite our intelligence, we often fall prey to many 
cognitive errors and fallacies. It is due to relying on our intuitive, heuristic type 1 processes, instead of 
employing more deliberate and accurate type 2 processes. Stanovich (2011) further divides type 2 processes 
into two parts – algorithmic mind is connected with our cognitive abilities to solve the problems and reflective 
mind is connected with our disposition to recognize the need for more effortful cognitive processes and our 
dispositions to engage in them. People are sometimes called “cognitive misers” due to their tendency to employ 
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the least effortful ways to solve a given problem. Stanovich (2011) also introduced framework for classification 
of such cognitive errors. Suboptimal reasoning (and thus implications for rational behaviour of people) can be 
caused either by three general types of errors: (1) dysfunctional autonomous system, (2) tendency to miserly 
processing, or (3) so called mindware problems.  
Stanovich (2011) also asserts that rationality can be divided into fluid and crystallized in analogy with 
Cattel/Horn/Carroll Gfc theory, but acknowledges that in contrast with intelligence, rationality is probably 
more multifarious. Furthermore, rationality is also related to cognitive abilities (which are necessary but not 
sufficient for rational thinking) and our thinking dispositions or preferences for more effortful thinking, but 
both these constructs are measured in different ways. As was mentioned previously, to know one’s intelligence 
does not predict that s/he will act rationally (for review of relationship between rationality and intelligence see 
(Stanovich, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) and the same applies to self-reported thinking styles (for review of predictive 
validity of self-reported inventories related to rationality/intuition see Hanák, 2013). Kordačová (1994) studied 
relationship between irrationality, logical thinking (using syllogisms) and cognitive abilities, but she reports 
only findings regarding relationships to irrational beliefs. She found that correctness or erroneousness of logical 
reasoning did not change in dependence on the degree of irrationality. In our previous work (Čavojová & 
Hanák, 2014a) we found only weak correlations between measures of fluid rationality and cognitive styles. 
Multifariousness of rationality has important implications to education. If irrationality is caused by lack of 
knowledge or motivation, it should be addressed more easily than when it is caused by lack of cognitive 
abilities. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore the possibilities to measure one aspect of rational 
thinking (namely resistance to belief bias) and its connection to cognitive abilities (intelligence) and motivation 
for rational integration. In the next sections I will briefly introduce belief bias effect and its relation to rational 
thinking. 
  
1.1. Critical thinking and belief bias 
Critical thinking is one of the important aspects of rationality and teaching critical thinking is one of the 
main proclaimed objectives of almost all educational systems. The issue of critical thinking in teaching 
psychology in Slovakia was elaborated by Masaryk, Bašnáková and Kostovičová (2013), who pointed out that 
our curriculum concentrates more on remembering facts than critical appraisal of learned concepts and theories. 
Critical thinking is often connected with the ability to decouple prior beliefs and opinions from the evaluation 
of evidence and arguments (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007) and is closely related to logic, because it requires 
objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgment, which should adequately reflect the 
objective reality. 
Often the truth of many judgments cannot be determined without rigorous experimentations, but we can infer 
the correctness of a judgment by comparing the logical structure of the judgment with the structure of rules for 
correct reasoning (Gahér, 2003). Everyone who reasons correctly applies the logic rules, whether intuitively or 
consciously. However, there is a lot of evidence that we often fail to adhere to strictly logical rules and fall prey 
to many cognitive biases, mainly because we fail to decontextualize. Prescriptive logic states that we should 
apply the same rules regardless the context, but it is often not the case (for review of research done in Slovakia 
with regard to intuitive/heuristic processing see Ballová Mikušková, 2014).  
Belief bias is one of the examples of such cognitive errors. It means that we tend to evaluate the logical 
validity of deductive arguments mainly on the basis of our personal beliefs regarding the empirical status of the 
conclusion (Markovits & Nantel, 1989).  
Belief bias is studied most often by syllogistic reasoning paradigm where validity and the believability of the 
conclusion are put in conflict (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Morley, Evans, & 
Handley, 2004). Belief bias is then defined as greater acceptance of believable than unbelievable conclusions 
and logical competence can be defined as greater acceptance of valid conclusions than invalid conclusions.  
Belief bias research uses two main paradigms: production tasks (participants are asked to draw conclusions 
from the presented premises) and evaluation tasks (participants are presented with some premises and a 
conclusion to be evaluated – as valid if it necessarily follows from the premises and as invalid if it does not). 
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The most evidence has been associated with the evaluation tasks (see Morley et al., 2004), but some researchers 
argued that the requirement to evaluate a conclusion does not necessarily call for deductive thought (Johnson-
Laird & Steedman, 1978). Markovits and Nantel (1989) compared evaluation and production paradigm and 
found significant belief-bias effect in both, although the qualitative analysis indicated that belief-bias effect was 
more pervasive in production condition. 
There are also several kinds of syllogisms that can be used in research. A syllogism usually consists of three 
statements – the first two statements (premises) each specify the relationship between an end term and the 
middle term. There are also four possible logical quantifiers (some, all, no, and some … not) which determine 
the mood of the statement (A, I, E, O)2. The order in which the end term and the middle terms are presented can 
be manipulated to produce one of the four figures of the premises. Traditional label for these four figures is 
MP-SM, PM-SM, MP-MS, and PM-MS, where S is subject, P is predicate and M is a middle term connecting 
two premises, which does not appear in the conclusion. The order, in which the premises are presented, can 
also affect the logical performance of participants, which was reported as figural bias by Johnson-Laird and 
Steedman (1978) and  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984). They demonstrated a clear preference for the direction 
of the conclusion which interacted with the figure of the syllogism. 
In the present study we used the same materials (evaluation task with multiple-model syllogistic problems) 
as Morley et al. (2004): 1st figure was of two kinds (SiM, MeP, SoP for valid conclusion, SeM, MoP, SoP for 
invalid conclusion) and 4th figure (PeM, MiS, SoP for valid conclusions, PiM, MiS, SoP for invalid 
conclusion). Conclusions of the 1st figure type syllogisms were in preferred direction, conclusion of the 4th 
figure type was in non-preferred direction (Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). Johnson-Laird and Steedman 
(1978) recommend the each syllogism separately (due to effects of figural bias and preferred direction of 
conclusion), so the secondary aim of this paper is to examine which kind of syllogism is the most suitable for 
assessing the belief bias (and resistance to belief bias). 
According to Morley et al. (2004) the influence of belief bias interacts with logical status of a problem and is 
more strongly associated with reasoning on invalid problems. In their study there was only small difference in 
the acceptance rates of believable (89%) and unbelievable conclusions (59%), but there was a larger difference 
in acceptance rates for believable (71%) and unbelievable (10%) conclusions for invalid problems.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants and procedure 
A total of 597 participants (Mage= 19.9 years, SD=2.45; 102 men, 470 women, 25 not indicating their 
gender) took part in the study. The participants were recruited at a pedagogical faculty of large university in 
Slovakia, so the sample was heterogeneous in their majors, and they were a part of a participant pool who 
received credit for two different courses for their participation.  
Participants completed three different batteries of tasks for the larger study. The intelligence testing (N=501) 
took place on one session and was collected by author of the paper and her colleagues, formal reasoning tasks 
(syllogisms) together with thinking dispositions questionnaires and other measures were collected via internet 
using survio.com online survey software (N=406). 
2.2. Measures 
Participants completed a syllogistic reasoning task (to measure belief bias), cognitive abilities measure and 
thinking disposition measure. 
 
 
2(A) universal affirmative (All A are B); (I) particular affirmative (Some A are B); (E) universal negative (No A are B); (O) particular 
negative (Some A are not B). 
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2.2.1 Cognitive ability: Vienna matrix test (VMT) 
VMT is based on the classical Raven’s test of progressive matrices – two items are from Standard 
Progressive Matrices and 1 from Advanced Progressive Matrices constructed by Raven. It consists of 24 items 
in increasing difficulty and is time-limited (25 minutes). Every task contains picture matrix 3x3 with the 
missing picture in the third row. The task of the participant is to fill in correctly one of the eight possibilities. 
The essence of the test is to find out the pattern and the test contains several different patterns of rules 
(distribution of symbols in the task, adding up the symbols, increasing or decreasing the number of symbols or 
combination of more principles). The VMT shows high correlations with Intelligence Structure Test and the 
authors conclude that it reflects reliably general cognitive factor. The test is supposed to be culture-fair as it is 
based on figural content. We used Czech adaptation by Klose, Černochová, Král published by Testcentrum in 
2002. The means score for our sample (N=501) was 16.45 (SD=3.9)3. 
 
2.2.1 Belief bias in syllogistic reasoning 
We used eight syllogistic reasoning problems from the Experiment 1 reported by Morley, Evans and 
Handley (2004). Half of the problems were worded such that the validity judgment was congruent with the 
believability of the conclusion (these were termed consistent syllogisms), in the other half of problems the 
validity of judgment was in conflict with believability of conclusion (these were termed inconsistent 
syllogisms). This resulted in four types of syllogisms: consistent syllogisms could be either valid-believable 
(e.g. Some healthy people are unhappy. No unhappy people are astronauts. (Therefore) Some healthy people 
are not astronauts.), or invalid-unbelievable (e.g. No millionaires are hard-workers. Some hard-workers are rich 
people. (Therefore) Some millionaires are not rich people.). Inconsistent syllogisms could be either valid-
unbelievable (e.g. No religious people are healthy. Some healthy people are priests. (Therefore) Some priests 
are not religious.), or invalid-believable (e.g. No highly trained dogs are vicious. Some vicious dogs are police 
dogs. (Therefore) Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs.).  
To be able to use inferential statistics, we transformed raw data into scores – for each correctly solved 
syllogism (accepting valid solutions and rejecting invalid solutions regardless their believability and conclusion 
direction) participant gained 1 point. We also summed scores for combined types of syllogisms – i.e. valid-
believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable and invalid-unbelievable; valid-believable and invalid-
unbelievable were then added to form consistent syllogism score, valid-unbelievable and invalid-believable 
were added to form inconsistent syllogism score. Thus, we used all 15 variables (8 individual syllogism scores, 
4 subtotals according to validity and believability, 3 totals – consistent, inconsistent and overall). 
This type of problems is considered as the reflection of major critical thinking skill – i.e. putting aside one’s 
prior knowledge and reason from new premises (Toplak et al., 2013). According to Macpherson and Stanovich 
(2007) belief bias can be expressed as difference between the number of consistent problems answered 
correctly and the number of inconsistent problems answered correctly. They assert, however, that with adult 
participants the difference score is less reliable than the raw number of inconsistent problems answered 
correctly due to a celling effect, therefore we analyzed both variables (score for inconsistent problems 
answered correctly and the difference between the two scores). 
 
2.2.1 Motive for rational integration: Master rationality Motive Scale 
Master Rationality Motive Scale (MRMS, Stanovich, 2011) measures the construct of rational motivation 
(felt need for rational integration). It combines questions from few other scales, mostly measuring cognitive 
styles or personality. MRMS consists of 15 questions. Five questions are new (items 8 - 13), but all others used 
from different scales and inventories. We used 6 point Likert scale (1 – completely disagree to 6 – completely 
agree). Scores could range from 15 (little motive for rational integration) to 90 (high motive for rational 
integration). Internal consistency of MRMS was examined by Hanák, Čavojová, and Ballová Mikušková 
(2014) and was quite low (Cronbachʼs alpha = 0.638); the means score in our sample was 57.33 (SD=8.25). 
 
 
 
3Raw score transformed to IQ scores gave these descriptive results: MIQ=106.8 (SD=15.5). 
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3. Results 
First, we analyzed whether there are significant differences between the directions of conclusion within the 
valid problems. There was no significant difference between Valid-Believable preferred (and Valid-Believable 
non-preferred problems (χ2=2.488, p=.072) in accepting problem as valid. However, there was difference in 
accepting unbelievable solutions as valid depending on the conclusion direction (χ2=23.507, p<.001). 
Significantly more participants rejected conclusion as valid when it was unbelievable. In case of invalid 
problems, there was no difference in accepting invalid conclusions (χ2=1.854, p=.103) between preferred and 
non-preferred direction, but again, there was difference in accepting invalid conclusion (χ2=3.469, p=.041) 
between preferred and non-preferred direction. The main effect of conclusion direction seem to be for 
unbelievable conclusions, where preferred direction leads to higher logical competence (accepting valid and 
rejecting invalid conclusions when the solution is unbelievable). 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for all problems according to conclusion direction, validity and belief 
believable unbelievable 
preferred non-preferred preferred non-preferred 
valid % of accepted answers 65,9 73,9 67,4 38,5 
mean score (SD) 0,66 0,73 0,67 0,39 
invalid % of accepted answers 65,7 55 17,4 44,3 
mean score (SD) 0,33 0,45 0,83 0,55 
 
We also examined difference between believable and unbelievable conclusions after combining preferred 
and non-preferred direction of conclusion. In general, more people accepted believable (50.2%) rather than 
unbelievable (31.1%) conclusion, when preferred and non-preferred conclusions were combined. Also more 
people accepted invalid conclusion when it was believable (37.6%) than when it was unbelievable (9.3%), 
when preferred and non-preferred conclusions were combined. Logical competence of participants was 
manifested by the fact, that in general, they accepted more valid than invalid conclusions (50.20% vs. 37.6% in 
case of believable conclusions and 31.1% vs. 9.3% in case of unbelievable conclusions).  
Significant belief bias was displayed; the mean number of consistent syllogism answered correctly (2.77, 
SD=0.94) was significantly higher than the mean number of inconsistent syllogisms answered correctly (1.84, 
SD=1.07), t(433)=13.551, p<0.001. Participants did not show consistent logical competence – while they 
solved correctly more valid (1.39, SD=.67) than invalid syllogisms (.78, SD=.70) when these were believable 
(t=13.059, p<0.001), they solved correctly more invalid (1.37, SD=.65) than valid syllogisms (1.06, SD=.76) 
when these were unbelievable (t=-6.284, p<0.001). 
Next, we examined the relationship between resistance to belief bias and cognitive ability and thinking 
dispositions. In agreement with Macpherson and Stanovich (2007) we used number of inconsistent syllogism 
answered correctly as the best correlational measure of the ability to overcome the belief bias despite the fact 
that there was no evidence of celling effect in our sample. There was no correlation between cognitive ability 
and resistance to belief bias (r=.094, p=.059) and rational integration (MRMS) and resistance to belief bias (r=-
.004, p=.929).  
Because of the significant differences between individual syllogism (due to direction of conclusion or their 
specific type) we performed correlational analysis for all individual syllogisms and their various combinations 
and these results are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Correlation between individual syllogisms and cognitive ability and master rationality motive 
cognitive 
ability 
(VMT) 
MRMS 
Valid-believable Preferred -0,015 0,08 
Valid-believable Non-preferred 0,075 0,066 
Invalid-unbelievable Preferred 0,024 0,006 
Invalid-unbelievable Non-preferred 0,064 -0,057 
Valid-unbelievable Preferred ,112* -0,066 
Valid-unbelievable Non-preferred ,118* 0,046 
Invalid-believable Non-preferred -0,004 0,045 
Invalid-believable Preferred -0,017 -0,039 
syllogism sum Valid-Believable 0,039 ,101* 
syllogism sum Invalid-Believable -0,014 0,006 
syllogism sum Invalid-Unbelievable 0,064 -0,041 
syllogism sum Valid-Unbelievable ,146** -0,011 
syllogism sum total ,117* 0,025 
consistent syllogisms  0,071 0,043 
inconsistent syllogisms 0,094 -0,004 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
It seems that cognitive ability was most related to correct solution in valid-unbelievable syllogisms 
regardless the direction of the conclusion (preferred or non-preferred), although the relationship is rather weak. 
Interestingly, master rationality motive was related only to performance in valid and believable syllogisms.  
4. Discussion 
One of the aims of this paper was to examine which kind of syllogisms is the most suitable for assessing 
resistance to belief bias as one of the major aspects of resistance to miserly processing, which is hypothesised 
to be major dimension of fluid rationality (Stanovich, 2011). As expected, belief bias was most associated with 
inconsistent syllogism problems. Direction of conclusion did not have major effect on the solution, with the 
only exception of valid-unbelievable problems, where formulation of conclusion in the preferred direction lead 
to average score comparable with scores in solving consistent syllogisms (even higher than for invalid-
unbelievable syllogisms with conclusion formulated in non-preferred way).  
As expected, the inconsistent syllogisms proved to be most difficult (only 5.5% of the sample solved 
correctly all 4 inconsistent syllogisms, in contrast with 23.3% who solved correctly all 4 consistent syllogisms). 
This was true regardless of the direction of conclusion formulation, with the only one exception – valid-
unbelievable syllogism with preferred direction of conclusion. We can only speculate, but maybe the reason for 
this result is the concrete content of the syllogism (judges), with conclusion “Some judges do not have good 
education”, which in Slovakia due to many scandals connected with judicial sphere has become more 
believable than unbelievable. (Scandals connected with legal colleges, where people can “buy” education, 
when their parents are already in legal occupation, dehonestation of lawyers and especially judges due to their 
political and mafia connections, etc.).  
Morley et al. (2004) suggested that belief bias is primarily associated with the rejection of unbelievable 
conclusion and is hence a negative or “debiasing” effect, because there is significant reduction in the 
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acceptance rates of unbelievable conclusion especially for invalid problems. They distinguish between negative 
belief bias (rejection of unbelievable conclusions) and positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable 
conclusion). Our results revealed that, in fact, people were more able to solve correctly invalid problems 
(M=1.54, SD=.24), than valid (M=1.39, SD=.26) problems (t=9.377, p<.001). 
The main aim of this paper, however, was to explore resistance to belief bias and its relationship with 
cognitive ability and motivation to be rational. We found only weak relationship between valid and 
unbelievable syllogisms and cognitive ability, which means that people with higher cognitive ability were 
better able to resist belief bias (or maybe they just knew better how to solve syllogisms and de-contextualize 
them from the content). Markovits and Nantel (1989) found in their study that the belief-bias effect exists 
independently of the participants’ abstract reasoning abilities (using the task with abstract syllogisms). 
Stanovich (2011b) explains the lack of mutual relationships between typical cognitive abilities test (algorithmic 
level) and tests of critical thinking, such as syllogisms (reflective level) by partitioning Type 2 processes into 
algorithmic and reflective mind. Algorithmic mind (efficiency of cognitive processes) is usually assessed by 
test measuring optimal performance, while reflective mind (ability to recognize the need for more effortful 
thinking) is usually assessed by test measuring typical performance. Importance of the instruction that makes 
the necessity to adhere to strictly logical rules and to de-contextualize salient was shown by many studies (e.g. 
Čavojová & Hanák, 2014b; Evans, 2003; Jurkovič, Čavojová, & Hanák, 2014) and this effect can also explain 
our results. While during intelligence testing participants knew exactly that their cognitive abilities were tested 
and tried to perform at their best (and the test itself is highly abstract and de-contextualized to be culture-fair), 
the syllogism task was part of a larger battery and although the instruction was to take into account only 
information from the premises, they were probably not so motivated to show their best performance and the 
score reflects more typical performance of students (in some cases maybe even to get over with a task 
necessary for a credit as quickly as possible).  
In this study we were able to identify syllogistic problems that created the strongest belief bias (and thus to 
differentiate between cognitive misers and people resistant to belief bias) and which can be used in further 
studies to test Stanovichʼs proposed framework of cognitive errors. However, some questions still remain. For 
instance, which is the most predictive for real-life rationality – testing optimal (cognitive abilities) or typical 
performance (critical thinking skills)? It is obviously important to have some level of cognitive abilities to be 
able to come to the correct solution, but for real-life performance it is probably more important to be able to 
detect the need for using one’s abilities properly. However, self-report measures of rational motivation did not 
prove very telling of one’s actual performance. Another important consideration in Stanovichʼs theory is that he 
places resistance to belief bias (measured by paradigm of syllogism testing) within dimension of resistance to 
miserly processing, which should be a part of fluid rationality. However, it can be as well part of crystallized 
rationality and represent the mindware gaps. Solving syllogisms correctly (regardless of their content, figure 
and direction of conclusion) is just a matter of learning a correct algorithm (e.g. using Venn’s diagrams), which 
clearly represents a “mindware gap”. This has a huge implication for education of (not only) future teachers. It 
means that we are able to learn some strategies that would help us to function more rationally and efficiently in 
modern world and that inclusion of “old-fashioned” disciplines, such as logic, into a modern curriculum should 
be of high importance.  
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